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Abstract—Mobile networks are vulnerable to signalling attacks
and storms that are caused by traffic patterns that overload
the control plane, and differ from distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks in the Internet since they directly attack the
control plane, and also reserve wireless bandwidth without
actually using it. Such attacks can result from malware and
mobile botnets, as well as from poorly designed applications, and
can cause service outages in 3G and 4G networks which have been
experienced by mobile operators. Since the radio resource control
(RRC) protocol in 3G and 4G networks is particularly susceptible
to such attacks, we analyze their effect with a mathematical
model that helps to predict the congestion that is caused by an
attack. A detailed simulation model of a mobile network is used
to better understand the temporal dynamics of user behavior and
signalling in the network and to show how RRC based signalling
attacks and storms cause significant problems in the control plane
and the user plane of the network. Our analysis also serves to
identify how storms can be detected, and to propose how system
parameters can be chosen to mitigate their effect.
Index Terms—Network Attacks, Malware, App Malfunctions,
UMTS Networks, 3G, 4G, Signalling Overload, Performance
Analysis, Simulation
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART DEVICES have not gone unnoticed by cyber-criminals, who have started to target mobile platforms [1]–
[4], and subscribers and mobile network operators (MNOs)
face new security challenges [5], including the identification
and mitigation of signalling attacks and storms, which over-
load the control plane through traffic that causes excessive
signalling in the network. The susceptibility of mobile net-
works to such attacks has been identified [6]–[9], and they
have now become a reality that MNOs have to face regularly
due to deliberate, malicious actions either by malware running
on the smart devices inside the mobile network, or by Internet
hosts outside the core network.
Thus signalling attacks and storms are indeed an emerging
cyber-security threat in mobile networks, which are a major
component of our cyber infrastructure. As we look at the
future, we can expect that UMTS and LTE networks will
also support major machine-to-machine communications [10]
where the human being is not in the loop to identify and
remediate against an apparent attack. In the first instance, we
can expect that UMTS will have to be secured against such
attacks and into the future that LTE should be an increasing
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object of studies to detect and mitigate against signalling
storms and attacks [11]–[13].
The mobile world witnessed its first botnet in 2012 [14],
through which an attacker can disrupt mobile services by a
DDoS-like [15] attack, overloading the control plane of the
mobile network through excessive signalling, rather than the
data plane as in traditional DDoS attacks in the Internet.
The attacker usually compromises a large number of mobile
devices forming a mobile botnet [16], which can also be
leveraged for other malicious activities in addition to launching
signalling attacks. Although in principle some of these attacks
can be mitigated by smart routing [17] inside the core network,
such facilities are currently not available.
In order to improve the efficiency of the attack, the attacker
can actively probe the network in order to infer the network’s
parameters [18]–[20], and also identify IP addresses at specific
locations within the network [21]. Indeed, a review of 180
MNOs showed that 51% of them allow mobile devices to
be probed from the Internet, by either assigning them public
IP addresses, allowing IP spoofing, or permitting mobile-to-
mobile probing within the network [21,22]. Smart mobile
devices are also increasingly used in emergency management
systems, especially in urban environments [23]–[25]. Thus
they are likely to be targeted in conjunction with other physical
or cyber attacks in order to further compromise the safety and
confidentiality of civilians and emergency responders [26,27].
Since the radio resource control (RRC) protocol in UMTS
and LTE networks [28,29] is susceptible to signalling attacks,
the objective of this paper is to analyse the effect of RRC-
based signalling attacks and storms in UMTS networks. While
earlier work in this area has focused on signalling behavior
from an energy perspective [30]–[32], we hope to provide a
greater understanding of the bottlenecks and vulnerabilities in
the radio signalling system of mobile networks in order to
pave the way for the detection and mitigation of signalling
attacks and storms.
For this purpose, we first present a probability model [33] of
signalling state transitions for a single UMTS user, from which
we derive analytical results regarding the user’s behaviour
when attacked and the impact it has on the network. We
also present results from simulation experiments, which enable
us to clarify the temporal dynamics of user behavior and
signalling and to validate the mathematical model. Then we
show how certain specific system parameters such as time-
outs can be used to lessen or mitigate the effect of storms and
signalling attacks.
II. SIGNALLING STORMS
Signalling storms are similar to signalling attacks, but
they are mainly caused by poorly designed or misbehaving
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mobile applications that frequently establish and tear-down
data connections in order to transfer small amounts of data.
Many mobile applications are designed and developed by soft-
ware companies who mainly have an “Internet” background
and thus are not familiar with the control plane of mobile
networks. They therefore assume that connectivity is a given
and design their applications without taking into account the
specifics of mobile networks. A good example is the case of
an Android VoIP application popular in Japan, which used
frequent keep-alive messages even when the users were idle,
causing a signalling overload and a major outage in the mobile
network [34]. In a similar incident, the launch of the free
version of the Angry Birds application on Android caused
excessive signalling load due to the frequent communications
generated by the in-game advertisements [35]. Such problems
have prompted the mobile network industry to promote best
practices for developing network-friendly applications [36,37].
Some applications, which may not normally generate exces-
sive signalling, go haywire when an unexpected event occurs,
such as loss of connectivity to an Internet server. For example,
an important feature of smartphones is the ability to receive
“push notifications” from cloud services in order to notify the
user of an incoming message or VoIP call. This feature is
enabled by having the mobile device send periodic keep-alive
messages to a cloud server. In normal operation, this keep-
alive period is a large value, e.g. 5 minutes. However, if for any
reason the cloud service becomes unavailable, then the mobile
device will attempt to reconnect more frequently, generating
significantly higher signalling load than normal in the process
as has recently been reported [38].
Signalling storms could also result from large-scale malware
infections which target the user rather than the network, but
generate excessive signalling as a by-product of malicious
activity. Examples of malware that would cause signalling
storms if many users are infected are SMS/email spammers,
adware, premium service abusers and botclients. All of these
malware generate frequent but small amounts of data, re-
quiring repeated signalling to allocate and deallocate radio
channels and other resources, and therefore have a negative
impact on the control plane of the network. Unfortunately for
the MNOs, such malware are among the top threats currently
encountered on smartphones and tablets [3,39,40].
Recent incidents have shown that the threat of signalling
attacks and storms is very real and that they have the potential
to cause major outages in mobile networks. Unlike flash
crowds which last for a short time during special occasions
and events such as New Year’s Eve, signalling attacks and
storms are unpredictable and they persist until the underlying
problem is identified and resolved by the MNO. Considering
their impact on the availability and security of mobile net-
works, it is evident that MNOs have a strong incentive to
safeguard their users from malware and to proactively detect
and mitigate signalling attacks and storms in order to protect
their infrastructure and services [5,41].
III. THE RADIO RESOURCE CONTROL PROTOCOL
In UMTS networks, the radio resource control (RRC) pro-
tocol is used to manage resources in the radio access network
UE Node B RNC
SGSN GGSN
HSS
Radio access network
(RAN)
Core network (CN)
Internet
Fig. 1. The basic architecture of a UMTS network. UEs are the mobile
terminals, e.g. smartphones, connected to the mobile network via base stations
(Node Bs). Node Bs maintain the radio channels with the UEs. The RNC
controls the radio resources and the Node Bs in the RAN.
(RAN) [28]. It operates between the UMTS terminals, i.e. the
user equipment (UE), and the radio network controller (RNC).
Figure 1 shows the basic architecture of a UMTS network,
depicting the RAN and the core network (CN) elements
comprising the packet-switched domain of the mobile network.
The RNC is the switching and controlling network element
in the RAN. It performs radio resource management (RRM)
functions in order to guarantee the stability of the radio
path and the QoS of radio connections by efficient sharing
and management of radio resources. The RRC protocol is
utilized for all RRM-related control functions such as the
setup, configuration, maintenance and release of radio bearers
between the UE and the RNC. The RRC protocol also carries
all non-access stratum signalling between the UE and the CN.
In order to manage the radio resources, the RRC protocol
associates a state machine to each UE, which is maintained
synchronized at the UE and the RNC via RRC signalling
messages. The RNC controls the transitions between the RRC
states based on information it receives from the UEs and
the Node Bs on available radio resources, conditions of the
currently used radio bearers, and requests for communication
activity. As shown in Fig. 2, there are typically four RRC
states, given in order of increasing energy consumption and
data rate: idle, cell-PCH, cell-FACH and cell-DCH. In the rest
of this paper, we refer to state cell-X simply as X. Whenever
the UE is not in the idle state, it is in connected mode and
has a signalling connection with the RNC. In connected mode,
the location of the UE is known by the RNC at the level of
a single cell, which is maintained by cell updates sent by the
UE either periodically or when it changes cells. We describe
the RRC states in more detail below.
Idle: This is the initial state when the UE is turned on.
In this state, the UE does not have a signalling connection
with the RNC, and therefore the RNC does not know the
location of the UE. Its location is known by the CN at the
accuracy of the location area or routing area, which is based
on the latest mobility signalling the UE performed with the
CN. Any downlink activity destined for a UE in idle mode
will require paging in order to locate the UE at the cell level.
Since the UE does not have an RNC connection, it cannot
send any signalling or data until an RNC connection has been
established.
FACH: The UE is in connected mode, and the radio
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Fig. 2. RRC states. The figure on the left shows the typical number of
signalling messages exchanged within the RAN for each transition. The other
figures show the approximate energy consumption and maximum data rate at
the UE.
connection between the UE and the RNC uses only common
channels which allow low-rate data transmission.
DCH: The UE is in connected mode, and the radio con-
nection uses resources dedicated to the UE. While in DCH,
the UE may use shared channels, dedicated channels or both.
The data rate of the connection is significantly higher than the
FACH state, but energy use is also higher.
PCH: This is a low-energy state that allows the UE to
maintain its RNC connection and thus stay in connected mode,
but it cannot send or receive any traffic while in this state.
While in PCH, the UE listens to paging occasions on the
paging channel. This state is optional and it can be enabled or
disabled by the MNO according to their policies. Although the
PCH state is a low-energy state, the UE still consumes more
power than in the idle state. Therefore, some MNOs choose
to disable the PCH state in order to allow the UE to return
to idle mode quickly and thus reduce its energy consumption.
We will investigate the effect of the PCH state on signalling
load in Sec. VI.
State demotions from a higher to a lower state,
e.g. DCH→FACH, occur based on radio bearer inactivity
timers at the RNC. The exact order of state demotions is
dependent on MNO policy, but a progression as shown in
Fig. 2 is common, although some MNOs skip the FACH
and/or PCH states. State promotions from the idle and PCH
states occur depending on uplink and downlink activity. For
example, when the UE has uplink data to send, it sends an
“RNC connection request” if in idle, or a “cell update” if in
PCH, to the RNC in order to move to a state where it can send
and receive data. Whether the UE is promoted to the FACH
or DCH state is dependent on MNO policy. A FACH→DCH
transition is performed based on buffer occupancy of the
uplink and downlink radio links as observed by the RNC.
Table I summarizes when RRC state transitions occur and
the number of signalling messages exchanged to effect each
transition. In our simulations, we assume the RRC state
progression given in Fig. 2. The UE goes from idle to FACH
initially, and then to DCH if the buffer threshold is reached.
The UE goes from DCH to FACH upon demotion from DCH.
Whether the UE goes from FACH to PCH, or to idle, depends
on whether the PCH state is enabled. For an x→ y transition,
we use rxy and cxy to denote the number of signalling
TABLE I
RRC STATE TRANSITIONS AND NUMBER OF SIGNALLING MESSAGES
EXCHANGED
Transition Triggering event rxy cxy
Idle→FACH Uplink or downlink traffic 15 5
PCH→FACH Uplink or downlink traffic 3 -
FACH→DCH Radio link buffer threshold (Θ) reached,
Θ = 1500 B
7 -
DCH→FACH Expiry of inactivity timer T1 = 6s 5 -
FACH→Idle Expiry of inactivity timer T2 = 12s, PCH
disabled
5 3
FACH→PCH Expiry of inactivity timer T2 = 4s, PCH
enabled
3 -
PCH→Idle Expiry of inactivity timer T3 = 20min, PCH
enabled
6 3
messages exchanged within the RAN and between the RAN
and the CN, respectively.
The RRC protocol was designed to manage the limited radio
resources among multiple UEs and to decrease energy use at
the UE. It is therefore biased towards demoting the UE to a
lower state as soon as possible, especially if the UE is in the
DCH or FACH state. Indeed, as the number of smartphones
accessing UMTS networks has increased, the industry has
introduced improvements and changes in order to get more
data rate out of limited radio resources, such as HSDPA and
HSUPA, and to improve the energy use of smartphones. For
example, fast dormancy enables the UE to indicate to the
RNC when it has no more uplink data to send for a speedier
demotion to the PCH or idle state. In addition, some MNOs
choose to disable the PCH state in order to allow the UE
to return to idle mode quickly and thus reduce its energy
consumption. As we will discuss in Sec. VI, this tendency
to perform hasty RRC demotions result in excessive signalling
load in the mobile network, especially in the case of deliberate
attacks or signalling storms that result from poorly designed
applications.
The RNC will customarily release radio resources for a
UE soon after activity ceases in its channel, making those
resources available for other UEs. Thus it uses short inactivity
timers, which are in the order of 2–10 seconds (see Table I).
These short timers make the RRC protocol susceptible to
signalling attacks, as an attacker that approximately determines
the values of the T1 and T2 timers can then launch a devas-
tating attack from a relatively small number of compromised
UEs, as we discuss in Sec. VI. In addition, when combined
with the “chatty” nature of many mobile applications, the
tendency to deallocate radio channels quickly necessarily leads
to increased RRC signalling in order to reconfigure or setup
channels that were released a short time ago, rendering the
mobile network vulnerable to RRC based signalling storms.
We thus focus on the RRC protocol in order to better
understand its signalling behavior, and investigate under which
conditions signalling load becomes excessive. In the next
section, we develop a mathematical model of the signalling
behavior of the UE, and later derive analytical results from it.
Section V describes our simulation model of UMTS networks.
In Sec. VI, we describe our experimental setup and discuss our
findings on the effect of signalling attacks targeting the RRC
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Fig. 3. Markov model of the signalling behavior of the UE
protocol.
IV. MODELING SIGNALLING BEHAVIOR OF THE UE
Analytical models [42] are a useful way to gain insight into
the main performance interactions within a telecommunica-
tions system. Thus we will first review the work in [43] for a
single UE’s signalling behavior which focuses on the potential
of causing signalling storms. We then extend the analysis to
include the effect of congestion which limits the signalling
load that a set of misbehaving UEs can impose on the network
during a storm.
Consider a UE which generates both normal and malicious
connections, and suppose that its RRC state machine is de-
scribed by Fig. 2. We will represent the state evolution of the
UE by a Markov model as presented in Fig. 3. Let λL and
λH be the rates at which low and high bandwidth connections
are normally made, and µL and µH be the rates at which
these connections terminate. Furthermore, denote by FL the
state when the UE is using the bandwidth of FACH, and by
DL and DH the states when low and high rate requests are
handled while the UE is in DCH. Since the amount of traffic
exchanged in states FL and DL is usually very small, we
assume that their durations are independent but stochastically
identical. At the end of normal usage, the UE transitions from
FL to F0 or from DH , DL to D0, where F0 and D0 are the
states when the UE is inactive in FACH and DCH, and before
the timers T2 and T1 expire. If the UE does not start a new
session for some time, it will be demoted from D0 to F0, and
from F0 to P , and will then return from P to I (i.e. PCH →
Idle) when inactivity timer T3 expires. Since the UE is not
able to communicate in P , the transition P → I is performed
by having the UE first move to FACH, release all signalling
connections, and finally move to I .
The attacking or misbehaving connections falsely induce
the UE to move from one state to another without the user
actually having any usage for such requests. Since in these
cases a transition to an actual bandwidth usage state does not
take place, unless the user starts a new session, the timers will
demote the state of the UE. Consequently, the attack results in
the usage of network resources both by the computation and
state transitions that occur for session handling, and through
bandwidth reservation that remains unutilised.
To perform a signalling attack, the attacker would need
to infer the radio network configuration parameters (i.e. the
timers Ti and radio link threshold Θ), and also monitor the
user’s activity in order to estimate when a transition occurs
so as to trigger a new one immediately afterwards. Naturally
there will be an error between the actual transition time and
the estimated one, and we denote the expected value of the
difference between the two time instants by τL and τH for
malicious transitions to FACH and DCH, respectively. In a
similar manner, if the storm is caused by a misbehaving mobile
application, then τL, τH represent the level of “synchroniza-
tion” between the malicious traffic bursts and the UE’s state
changes; for instance τH = 0 indicates the extreme case in
which a high rate burst is sent immediately after a demotion
from DCH.
Finally, let σ−1xy be the average time needed to establish
and/or release network resources during state promotion or
demotion x → y, and Sxy be the corresponding state when
the UE is waiting in state x for the transition to complete. Note
that this overhead is incurred only when the UE moves from
one RRC state to another, while changes within the same RRC
state (e.g. from inactive to active) occur instantaneously and
are seamless to the UE. If pis is the stationary probability that
the UE is in state s, then the average signalling load (msg/s)
on the RNC generated by the UE due to both normal and
malicious traffic is:
γr(w) = piI [(λL + τ
−1
L )rIF + (λH + τ
−1
H )rID]
+ piP [(λL + τ
−1
L )rPF + (λH + τ
−1
H )rPD]
+ [piF0 + piFL ](λH + τ
−1
H )rFD
+ piD0T
−1
1 rDF + piF0T
−1
2 [rFP1F→P + rFI1F→I]
+ piPT
−1
3 rPI1F→P, (1)
where the characteristic function 1x→y takes the value 1 if
the transition x → y is enabled and 0 otherwise, and w is a
congestion parameter which we define in the following section.
The UE also generates signalling with the CN whenever
it moves from or to the Idle state, leading to an average
signalling load on the SGSN given by:
γc(w) = piI [(λL + τ
−1
L )cIF + (λH + τ
−1
H )cID]
+ piF0T
−1
2 cFI1F→I + piPT
−1
3 cPI1F→P. (2)
A. Modeling Congestion in the Control Plane
The analytical model we just described can be solved
in closed-form [43] when the average transition delays are
known, allowing to determine the conditions and parameters
for which signalling misbehavior has the most serious conse-
quences on the network functioning. In normal circumstances,
state promotions and demotions last for few milliseconds that
represent only a small fraction of the total lifetime of a
session. However, when the mobile network servers become
overloaded, as in during a signalling storm, the time needed to
establish and release connections also increases, which in turn
limits the maximum signalling load that a set of misbehaving
UEs can impose on the network. To better understand the
effect of a signalling storm, we develop a simple model for
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the average time σ−1xy needed to perform the transition x→ y
as follows:
σ−1xy (w) = rxyw +
rxy∑
n=1
(txy[n] + δxy[n]) (3)
which consists of three components:
• Communication delay txy[n] comprising propagation and
transmission parts that are subject to the physical char-
acteristics of the links traversed by the n-th signalling
message exchanged during the transition. This delay de-
pends only on the path followed by the message, and we
ignore queueing at the transmission links, since signalling
storms do not affect the data plane, and thus they do not
translate into congestion in the wireless or wired links.
• Average queueing delay w at the RNC signalling server,
which is a function of the number of normal UEs served
by the RNC MN , the number of misbehaving ones MA,
and the RNC signalling load (1) of both normal γNr
and misbehaving γAr UEs. Note that we do not represent
congestion at the SGSN, since the CN is less susceptible
to signalling storms, especially when PCH is enabled.
• Processing time δxy[n] at the mobile network servers han-
dling the message, which we assume to be constant per
message type1 such that δxy[n] =
∑
s∈servers δxy,s[n].
The aggregate load that the RNC signalling server needs to
handle is then:
Γr(w) = M
NγNr +M
AγAr . (4)
Note that Γr is a function of w, which itself is determined
by Γr. Using a simple M/M/K system to model the RNC
signalling server, the average queueing delay can be obtained
by solving the non-linear expression [44]:
w =
(Kρ)K
K!(1− ρ)(Kν − Γr)
[
K−1∑
i=0
(Kρ)i
i!
+
(Kρ)K
K!(1− ρ)
]−1
,
(5)
where ρ(w) = ΓrKν , and ν is an “equivalent” average service
rate which depends on the composition of the signalling
messages processed by the RNC:
ν−1(w) = Γ−1r
∑
C∈{N ,A}
MC
∑
x,y
rxy∑
n=1
γCr,xyδxy,r[n], (6)
where γCr,xy is the signalling load on the RNC from a UE of
type C ∈ {N ,A} due to a transition x→ y, and δxy,r[n] ≥ 0
is the RNC’s processing time of the n-th signalling message
exchanged during the transition.
V. SIMULATION OF UMTS NETWORKS AND SIGNALLING
ANOMALIES
The mathematical model we have developed and described
in Sec. IV provides a good approximation of the signalling
behavior of the UE, and enables us to quickly derive analytical
results in order to investigate the effect of signalling attacks
and the values of the various network parameters, such as the
1Note that signalling message types are defined by the 3GPP standards and
known a priori.
Ti timers, on signalling load. In order to capture aspects of the
mobile network not explicitly represented in the mathematical
model, we have developed a discrete event simulation (DES)
model of the UMTS network, focusing on the signalling layer
in the RAN. We have developed models of the UE, Node
B, RNC, SGSN and GGSN, and also models of the “Internet
cloud” and Internet hosts (i.e. servers). While we do not model
the circuit-switched (CS) domain explicitly, the SGSN model
contains aspects of the MSC server necessary to establish and
tear-down CS calls, i.e. voice calls and SMS; our SGSN model
is therefore a hybrid of the SGSN and the MSC server.
The performance of the simulation was an important consid-
eration in our model design, and in order to be able to simulate
large scale mobile networks, we have adopted two approaches.
First, we have developed our simulation model so that we
support distributed simulation. We can therefore distribute
elements of the simulated mobile network over multiple logical
processes in order to leverage multiple hosts in a simulation,
allowing us to simulate much larger mobile networks than
would be possible with a single process. Second, we combine
packet-level and call-level representation of communications
in our model. Communications that are natively message
based or bursty in nature are represented at the packet level.
These include communications for SMS, email, web browsing,
and instant messaging. Other types of communications are
represented at the call level; examples include voice calls, VoIP
calls, and multimedia streaming.
In the control plane, the UE model consists of the session
management (SM), GPRS mobility management (GMM) and
RRC layers. In the data plane, it contains the application layer,
which has CS and IP applications representing all user activity,
the transport layer (TCP and UDP) and a simplified IP layer
that is adapted for mobile networks. We have a simplified
model of the RLC layer, but we do not explicitly model the
MAC and PHY layers; effects of changes in radio conditions
are modeled as random variations in the data rate of the radio
channels. Uplink and downlink radio transmissions over a
radio bearer (RB) are modeled by two single server, single
FIFO queue pairs, one for each direction as shown in Fig. 4.
The service time at the transmission server is calculated based
on the length of the currently transmitted RLC packet and the
current data rate for the RB. Changes in the RB data rate are
reflected on the service time of the current packet. Each UE
has one signalling RB and one data RB. In addition to the
transmission delays for the RBs, propagation and processing
delays are also modeled. We also model the usual communi-
cation delays (i.e. transmission, propagation and processing
delays) over wired links connecting the different network
elements, e.g. between the RNC and the SGSN.
Our RNC model has the RRC, RANAP, NBAP and GTP
protocols. The RRC model in the RNC consists of a single
signalling server and a single FIFO queue, used to model
the processing time δrxy for RRC signalling messages. The
server handles two classes of signalling messages, where
one class consists of signalling messages that effect a state
transition x→ y (e.g. the RB setup message), and the second
class includes all other signalling messages. The service time
assigned to the first class reflects the time taken to allocate
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(RLC buffer)
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Fig. 4. The simulation model of a radio bearer (RB), consisting of a single
server, single FIFO queue pair in each direction. The uplink and downlink
servers are located at the UE and the Node B, respectively.
and deallocate radio resources by the RNC, whereas a default
and smaller service time is used for the second class. In the
analytical results presented in the next section, K = 1, and
ν is calculated based on the δrxy values as defined here. As
the handler of RRC state transitions, this server will be one
of the main points of interest in our simulations, and as we
discuss in Sec. VI it will become overloaded as the severity
of the signalling attacks increases.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
In order to understand the effect of RRC based signalling
attacks in UMTS networks, we implemented our simulation
model in the OMNeT++ simulation framework [45]. We
present results from our simulation experiments and analytical
results derived from our mathematical model. The UMTS
network topology used in the simulations closely resembles
the architecture shown in Fig. 1. In our simulations we have
1000 UEs in an area of 2x2 km2, which is covered by 7 Node
Bs connected to a single RNC. The CN consists of the SGSN
and the GGSN, which is connected to 10 Internet hosts acting
as web servers. All UEs attach to the mobile network at the
start of the simulation, and remain attached. We simulate high
user activity in a 2.5 hour period, during which users are
actively browsing the web. Our web browsing model is based
on industry recommendations [46], and is described below.
A. Web Browsing Behaviour of the User
We model interactive web browsing behavior using a self-
similar traffic model as shown in Fig. 5. The parameters of
the web traffic model are random variables from probability
distributions, and Table II gives the values used in our simula-
tions, which are based on web metrics released by Google [47].
In addition to this random mode, the web application model
also supports a scripted mode in which given user traces are
replayed in order to inject browsing events at predetermined
times.
The activity period represents the time that the UE is active
during a 24 hour period, i.e. the hours during the day that it
is generating web traffic. The idle period between two activity
periods is the remaining hours within the 24 hours. The first
activity period starts after an activation delay da, and consists
of one or more browsing sessions. The first session within an
activity period starts after an initial session delay ds, and the
Inter-session
interval
Idle
period
Activity periodActivation
delay
Inter-request
intervalMain page
request
Embedded object
requests
Main page
response
Embedded object
responses
Session
Activity period
Simulation
start
Last main
page request
in session
Processing
delay
Initial session
delay
Fig. 5. Web traffic model representing interactive user browsing. Note that
time is not drawn to scale.
TABLE II
PARAMETERS OF THE WEB TRAFFIC MODEL
NameDescription Value
pa Activity period constant, 24 hours
da Activation delay (min.) uniform(1, 10)
ds Initial session delay is/2
ns Number of main page requests
in session
truncated normal µ = 10,
σ = 5, min = 2
is Inter-session interval (min.) truncated normal, µ = 20,
σ = 10, min = 2
ir Inter-request interval (sec.) truncated exponential,
λ−1 = 60, min = 10,
max = 600
lr Request size (B) truncated normal, µ = 600,
σ = 100, min = 300
lm Main page size, excluding
embedded resources
histogram [47]
limg Size of image resources (KB) truncated exponential,
λ−1 = 50, min = 1.2,
max = 400
ltxt Size of text resources histogram [47]
ne Number of embedded objects in
page
histogram [47]
RimgRatio of image resources to all
embedded resources in page
uniform(0.1, 0.5)
dpc Processing delay, client (ms) truncated normal, µ = 50,
σ = 10, min = 0
dps Processing delay, server (ms) truncated normal, µ = 4,
σ = 1, min = 1
time between the last and the first main request in one session
and the next respectively, is the inter-session interval is.
Within a session, the user generates requests for web pages,
which are called main page requests, and the first request is
scheduled at the start of the session. The request results in
a page response from the web server, which is subject to a
processing delay dpc at the client, representing the time it
takes for the web client at the UE to process the received
response. A web page contains zero or more embedded
objects, and the client generates an embedded object request
for each one. We assume that HTTP version 1.1 is used and
that each embedded object request is pipelined over a single
TCP connection. The length of a request is denoted by lr. The
inter-request interval ir is the time between the generation of
two consecutive main page requests, and it is independent of
the reception of the responses. The session length is controlled
by the number of main page requests ns in the session.
The web server generates a response for each request it
receives after a processing delay dps . The length of a main
page response is lm, and it excludes the sizes of any embedded
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objects and TCP/IP headers. The number of embedded objects
per page is ne and we model two types of objects: image and
text (e.g. CSS documents, scripts). The size of an embedded
object is limg and ltxt for image and text objects, respectively.
Rimg gives the ratio of image objects to all embedded objects
in a page. In the simulations, a client selects a web server
uniformly at random for each main page request.
B. The Attack Model
We consider two different attack strategies in our evaluation:
FACH and DCH attacks. In FACH attacks, the attacker aims to
overload the control plane by causing superfluous promotions
to the FACH state, and therefore needs to know when a
demotion from FACH occurs in the UE. In DCH attacks, the
demotion of interest is from the DCH state. As introduced in
Sec. IV, the error between the actual transition time and the
estimated one is denoted by τL and τH in the FACH and DCH
attack scenarios respectively.
In FACH attacks, the attacker sends a small data packet to a
random Internet server in order to cause a promotion to FACH.
Higher rate data traffic is generated in DCH attacks in order to
cause the buffer threshold to be reached and therefore result
in a promotion to DCH. For simulation purposes, our RRC
model at the UE informs all registered malicious applications
when an RRC state transition occurs. Before launching the
next attack, the attacker waits for a period of τL or τH after
a suitable demotion is detected, e.g. from FACH to PCH in
the FACH attack case, where τL, τH are random variables.
In our experiments, we assume that τL, τH are exponentially
distributed with mean = {0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 10, 14, 20, 30}s to sim-
ulate varying degrees of error on behalf of the attacker. For
signalling storms, the τ ’s represent the “synchronization” be-
tween the RRC state machine of the UE and the misbehaving
application, while the attack scenario represents whether the
misbehaving application generates low-rate or high-rate traffic.
We present results from the DCH attack scenario only since
the FACH attack scenario produces similar behaviour in most
cases.
VII. MODELING AND SIMULATION RESULTS
We performed simulation experiments in order to investigate
the effect of signalling attacks and storms due to the RRC
protocol on the RAN and the CN. We vary the number of
compromised or misbehaving UEs from 1% to 20% of all
UEs. Both normal and misbehaving UEs generate normal
traffic based on the web browsing model described above. The
misbehaving applications are activated gradually between 20
and 30 minutes from the start of the simulation in order to
prevent artifacts such as a huge spike of signalling load due
to many malicious applications coming online at the same
time. We collect simulation data only from the period when all
misbehaving UEs are active. Each data point in the presented
results is an average of five simulation runs with different
random seeds. The relevant RRC protocol parameters are as
given in Table I. We also present analytical results derived
from our mathematical model together with the simulation
results. We observe that as a result of correctly adjusting
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Fig. 6. Signalling load in the radio access network as a result of DCH
attacks, for different number of attackers. The 1/τH = 0 case corresponds
to a “no attack” scenario.
the parameters of the mathematical model based on initial
simulation results, and with the addition of the effect of
congestion into the model, the simulation and analytical results
show a high degree of agreement. We do not present analytical
results for Figs. 8b and 9 to prevent repetition of similar
results, and for Fig. 8a since the mathematical model does
not capture quality-of-experience.
Figure 6 shows the signalling load in the RAN under DCH
attacks, with PCH enabled and disabled. As τH decreases or
the number of attackers increase, the number of signalling
messages sent and received by the RNC towards the RAN
increases as expected. The rate of increase is dependent on
1/τH and higher when the number of attackers is high. We can
see that whether the PCH state is enabled does not affect the
behaviour of the signalling load in the RAN significantly, but
it still decreases the signalling load. An interesting observation
is that when PCH is disabled, there is a maximum load
when the percentage of attackers is ≥ 8% that is attained
with a high τH . This is worrying since it shows that a
maximum signalling load can be induced in the RAN by
signalling storms when a sufficient number of UEs misbehave
without requiring a high level of synchronization between the
misbehaving application and the RRC state machine. Enabling
the PCH state addresses this issue. Another useful observation
is that given a fixed number of attackers, RRC attacks are
self-limiting: as signalling load on the RNC increases, this
prevents attackers from being able to attack the network at
a high rate since they are themselves subject to longer waits
for channel allocations. We will re-visit this issue when we
discuss congestion at the RNC signalling server.
Figure 7 shows the signalling load in the CN under DCH
attacks, with PCH enabled and disabled, and demonstrates the
advantage of enabling the optional PCH state. We observe
that whether the PCH state is enabled has a significant effect
on the signalling load in the CN. This is because most RRC
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Fig. 7. Signalling load in the core network as a result of DCH attacks,
for different number of attackers. The 1/τH = 0 case corresponds to a “no
attack” scenario.
induced signalling with the CN occurs when the UE enters and
exits the idle state. Enabling the PCH state, which normally
has a very long inactivity timer (T3), prevents the UE from
entering the idle state prematurely, significantly decreasing the
signalling load in the CN at the cost of slightly more energy
consumption at the UE. Therefore, our recommendation would
be to enable PCH as a first step in the mitigation of RRC
based signalling attacks and storms. Enabling the PCH state
also eliminates the problem of the maximum signalling load
observed in Fig. 7b for high values of τH , which is due to the
interaction between τH and the RRC inactivity timers T1 and
T2. When τH > T1+T2, the UE enters the idle state as a result
of inactivity, and then the misbehaving application causes the
UE to go into FACH or DCH in order to send data, resulting
in excessive signalling with the CN. The long T3 timer of the
PCH state solves this issue.
Our results so far demonstrate how the mobile network
infrastructure is seriously affected by RRC based signalling
anomalies. These anomalies also have an appreciable impact
on the quality-of-experience (QoE) of the mobile user. Figure
8a shows the application response time at a normal UE, which
is defined as the time between when the user requests a web
page and when all of the web page is received. The response
time is not greatly affected when there are very few misbe-
having UEs and when τH is high. But delay increases by up
to 400% as the severity of the attack increases with increasing
number of attackers and 1/τH . User normally tolerate a wait
of 2–10 seconds for a web page to download [48,49], and
therefore the observed response times are significant from
a QoE view. The affected mobile users are highly likely to
attribute the bad QoE to the MNO, so the MNO has one
more incentive to detect and mitigate signalling problems in
its network.
The main reason for the increase in application response
time is the time it takes for the UE to acquire a radio channel
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Fig. 9. Radio channel utilization under DCH attacks, PCH disabled
in order to send and receive data, which includes, in addition
to communication delays between the UE and the RNC, the
service and queueing times experienced by the RRC signalling
messages effecting the channel acquisition. Figure 8b shows
that queueing time at the RRC signalling server component of
the RNC greatly increases as the number of attackers increase.
We observe that effects of congestion at the server become
significant when the percentage of attackers is > 4%, affecting
application response time for normal users, and also placing
a limit on the impact of signalling attacks on the network
since the attackers themselves are subject to longer delays for
channel acquisition.
Our final results relate to how the UE utilizes its allocated
radio resources, and provide a useful feature that we aim
to exploit in our future work on the detection of signalling
attacks. Figure 9 shows the ratio of time the UE is in the
FACH or DCH state while busy (i.e. sending or receiving data)
and idle. The most important observation is that a normal
UE, represented with 1/τH = 0, has a markedly different
behaviour than a misbehaving UE (1/τH > 0), and the
discrepancy increases with 1/τH . Normal UEs do not spend a
significant time in FACH or DCH as busy or idle, but attackers
spend a long time as idle while in FACH and DCH, i.e. their
session tails are comparatively longer than their session body.
This is because normal users only acquire the channel when
they have legitimate traffic, and they send larger chunks of
data and therefore use the channel for longer than attackers,
resulting in a low ratio of idle to busy time. Attackers, on
the other hand, frequently acquire the channel to send only a
small amount of “attack traffic” and therefore waste most of
the radio channel as reflected in their high ratio of idle to busy
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time. The exception to this is the FACH state when there is
congestion in the control plane due to the signalling attack: we
observe that attackers spend significantly long times as busy
in the FACH state when there is congestion, e.g. with 20% of
attackers, which is due to the long delay it takes the UEs to
acquire the channel as discussed above.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have investigated the effect of signalling
attacks and storms in mobile networks, focusing on signalling
anomalies that exploit the radio resource control (RRC) proto-
col. We presented a Markov model of the signalling behaviour
of the UE and extended the model for effects of congestion in
the control plane. The analytical model provides an accurate
representation of the RRC signalling behaviour and allows us
to reach quick analytical results.
We have also developed a simulation of a UMTS mobile
network, and simulation experiments were used to validate
the mathematical model, resulting in its improvement by the
addition of concepts not previously captured and the realistic
setting of the model parameters. We presented simulation and
analytical results, looking at how different components in the
mobile network are affected by signalling attacks and storms.
Our results show that RRC based signalling anomalies can
cause significant problems in both the control plane and the
user plane in the network, and provide insight into how such
attacks and storms can be detected and mitigated. While we
have focused on UMTS networks in this work, the RRC
protocol is also employed in LTE networks, and any RRC
related anomalies would have a more severe impact in LTE
networks since they employ only two RRC states (connected
and idle), and the mitigating effect of the long T3 timer used
in the PCH state are non-existent in LTE networks.
Future work can exploit the insight gained in this paper for
the detection and mitigation of signalling attacks in mobile
networks. One aspect that requires attention is the identifica-
tion of possible locations, such as specific cells, where attacks
may originate, and methods related to search and smart traffic
routing may prove valuable in this context [50,51]. Another
important aspect relates to identifying sets of representative
features for the detection of signalling attacks and storms,
and of the misbehaving UEs. An important consideration is to
prevent false positives as much as possible so as not to punish
normal “heavy” users. We will also develop system wide mod-
els based on queueing theory [52] that represent a single user
in a simple manner, to study mitigation methods that involve
randomisation and adaptively introducing artificial delays in
the state transitions of the UEs so that they may automatically
reduce the negative impact of attacks and signalling storms.
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